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PART I:
1.

THE FACTS

The Women's Legal Education and Action Fund ("LEAF") adopts the facts as set out in the

Respondent's

factum.

PART II:

POINTS IN ISSUE

2.

The issue in this appeal is the interpretation of the best interests of the child test under sections

16 and 17 of the Divorce Act in relocation cases.

PART ill:
10

THE ARGUMENT

A. WOMEN'S SOCIALANDECONOMICDISADVANTAGEFLOWINGFROMPRIMARY
RESPONSIBILITYFOR CHILDRENIS A SEX EQUALITYISSUE

a.
3.

THE GENDER-BASEDDIVISION OF LABOURPRIORTO SEPARATION

Historically, women have been almost exclusively responsible for the unpaid labour of child

care, whether or not they have also been employed in paid work. Currently women in marital and
non-marital relationships (hereinafter "spousal relationships") continue to bear prime responsibility

20

for the child care, regardless of employment.

Moge v. Moge, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 813 at 861.
M. Gunderson, L. Muszynski, and J. Kleck, Women and labour Market Poverty
(Ottawa: Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women, 1990) at 13, 14, 20, 22, 24-27.
Statistics Canada, Womenin Cana.da:A Statistical Repon, 3rd edition, Target Groups Project,
Cat. No. 89-503E, at 70, 83.
4.

30

Child care is largely treated as a private responsibility.

The work world is generally

unresponsive to family needs, having been historically structured on the assumption of the mother
taking responsibility for domestic work and child care at home.

Mage v. Moge, supra at 861.
L. Duxbury and C. Higgins, "Families in the Economy", chapter 3 in M. Baker, ed., Canada's
Changing Families: Challenges,toPublic Policy (Ottawa: Toe Vanier Institute of the Family,
1994) at 34-35.
Rosalie Abella, Repon of the Commissionon Equality in EmploymenJ.Royal Commission on
Equality in Employment (1984) at 28-29.

40
5.

Women's primary responsibility for child care has socially defined women as secondary earners

who are likely to limit their paid workforce participation. This division of labour has exacerbated
women's inequality in the paid workforce by contributing to systemic pay and employment inequity.
Rosalie Abella, ibid. at 28-32.
6.

At the same time, the division of labour during spousal relationships is gender-based in large

part because it has frequently been economical for women to limit their paid workforce participation

-2 -

to address child care needs. In response to the conflicting physical and emotional demands of paid
work and responsibilities for home and family, women make sacrifices affecting their paid work
opportunities.

Women are much more likely than men to interrupt their workforce participation,

work part-time or disrupt their workday to accommodate child care responsibilities.

Moge v. Moge, supra at 861.
Willick v. Willick, [1994) 3 S.C.R. 670, at 723.
N. Zukewich Ghalam, "Women in the Workplace", in Canadian Social Trends: A Canadian
Studies Reader, Volume 2 (Toronto: Thompson Educational Publishing, 1994) 141 at 145.
10

E. Diane Pask and M. L. (Mamie) McCall, ~s., How Much and Why? Economic Implications
of Marriage Breakdown: Spousal and Child Suppon (Calgary: Canadian Research Institute
for Law and the Family, 1989) at 56-72.
Statistics Canada, Women in Canada: A Statistical Repon, supra at 69, 70, 74.
Susan B. Boyd, "Potentialities and Perils of the Primary Caregiver Presumption" (1990),
Canadian Journal of Family Law Quanerly, 1-30, at 3-11, 19.

20

b.
7.

THE
GENDERED
SEPARATION

NATURE

OF

CHILD

CARE

FOLLOWING

For most women, the assumption of primary child care responsibilities after separation, is

simply a continuation of the responsibilities held by them prior to separation.

Young v. Young, [1993) 4 S.C.R. 3 at 49.
Eleanor E. Maccoby and Robert H. Mnookin, Dividing the Child: Social and Legal Dilemmas
of Custody (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992) at 268.

30

Janice Drakich, In Search of the Bene, Parent: The Social Construction of Ideologies of
Farherhood (1989), 3 Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 69, at 83-85.

i.

8.

CL"STODIAL PARENTS ARE PRThlARILY WOMEN

When married and unmarried spouses separate, it is overwhelmingly mothers that have sole

custody of their children, usually by agreement of the panies.

In 1991, mothers were awarded

custody in 74 % of all custody decisions settled in court, and 77% of single parent families were
40

headed by separated and divorced women.

Young v. Young, supra at 49.
Statistics Canada, Women in Canada: A Statistical Repon, supra at 18 and 25.
Federal/Provincial/Territorial Family Law Committee, Department of Justice, Canada, Custody
and Access: Public Discussion Paper (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1993)
at 13.
C. James Richardson, Divorce and Family Mediation Research Study in Three Canadian Cities,
(Minister of Supply & Services, 1988) at 268 - 270.
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ii.
9.

WOMEN HAVE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITYFOR CHILDREN IN JOINT
CUSTODY ARRANGEMENTS

In recent years, there has been an increased number of "joint custody" awards and agreements.

In joint custody arrangements, mothers usually continue to assume primary responsibility for their
children by providing most of the day-to-day care and decision-making. As well, children continue
to reside primarily with their mothers.

Young v. Young, supra at 49, 50.
Lapointe v. Lapointe (20 October 1995), unreported, Man.C.A. at 20, 21.
10

C. J. Richardson, Divorce and Family Mediation Research Study in Three Canadian Cities,
supra at 320.
Eleanor E. Maccoby and Robert H. Mnookin, Dividing the Child: Social and Legal Dilemmas
of Custody, supra at 268.
Federal/Provincial/Territorial
Family
Discussion Paper, supra at 13.

20

Statistics Canada,

Law Committee,

Custody and Access:

Public

Women in Canada: A Statistical Repon, supra at 18, 25.

10. Absent changes in social structures, it is highly predictable that women will continue to be
primarily

responsible

for children

following separation,

whether in sole or joint custody

arrangements.

Young v. Young, supra at 49.
Eleanor E. Maccoby and Robert H. Mnookin, Dividing the Child: Social and Legal Dilemmas
of Custody, supra at 279.

30

c.

THE SOCIALA.~ ECONO~OCDISADVA..'IT
AGE OF WOMENWITHSOLEOR
PRIMARY CUSTODIAL RESPONSIBILITYAFTER SEPARATION

11. The employment compromises made by women, before and after separation, impede their
ability to support themselves and their children following separation. Women who interrupt their
employment

experience

losses in numerous employment

related areas, including seniority,

opportunity for advancement, development of job skills, keeping skills up-to-date, fringe benefits,
40

and the ability to accumulate future benefits such as pensions and disability insurance.

Moge v. Moge, supra at 861.
E. Diane Pask and M. L. (Marnie) McCall, eds., How Much and lVhy? Economic Implications
of Marriage Breakdown: Spousal and Child Support, supra at 56-65.
12. Custodial
workworld's

mothers have difficulty meeting their child care responsibilities because of the
unwillingness to accommodate family responsibilities, and the lack of affordable,

quality child care and other social support systems, which are continually being eroded by
government fiscal restraint.

- 4 -

Willick v. Willick, supra at 714, 715, 720.
Brockie v. Brockie (1987), 5 R.F.L. (3d) 440 (Man. Q.B.) at 447-448.

Janine Brodie, Politics on the Margins: Restructuring and the Canadian Women's Movement
(Halifax: Femwood Publishing, 1995), at 57-58
Helen McKenzie and Vivian Shalla, Poverty in Canada (Library of Parliament Research
Branch, 1994) at 5.
National Council of Welfare, Women & Poverty Revisited (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and
Services 1990) at 49-52

10

13. Custodial mothers who face additional levels of discrimination beyond sex and family status,
experience

even greater difficulty in finding employment.

Women with disabilities, immigrant

women, aboriginal women and visible minority women experience higher levels of unemployment
and have lower incomes than other women in Canada.

Statistics Canada, Women in Canada: A Statistical Report, supra at 9, 121, 122, 131, 137, 138,
145, 146, 152, 160, 166.

20

National Council of Welfare, Women & Poverty Revisited (1990), at 112 - 127.
14. When single mothers are unable to obtain paid work, a life of poverty is virtually unavoidable.
Ninety-three

percent of single mothers who had no employment earnings were below the poverty

cut-offs in 1993.

Punam Khosla, Review of the Situation of Women in Canada (National Action Committee on
the Status of Women, 1993) (drawing on Statistics Canada, Perspectives, Spring, 1993, Cat.
No. 75-00lE) at 27.

15. Single parent mothers are 5 to 6 times more likely to live in poverty than are mothers raising
30

their children with a male panner. Three years after separation, the incomes of women and children

had dropped by at least 30%; while on average, men's incomes more than doubled those of their
former wives.
"Robert Glossop on the Canadian Family~ in Canadian Social Trends No. 35, Winter
1994, Statistics Canada at 9.
National Council of Welfare, Poverty Profile 1992 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services
Canada, 1994) at 4, 13, 14, 70.
C. A. Gorlick, "Divorce: Options Available, Constraints Forced, Pathways Taken", in chapter
7, N. Mandell, and A. Duffy, Canadian Families: Diversity, Conflict and Change (Harcourt
Place Canada, 1995) at 216, 225.
Helen McKenzie and Vivian Shalla, Poverty in Canada, supra, at 5.
16. The difficulty in meeting their child care responsibilities is magnified for custodial mothers,
particularly low income custodial mothers, who are socially isolated or geographically removed from
family and community.

Many women, such as immigrant women

aooaboriginal

women, face

-5additional disadvantage due to extreme social and physical isolation from family and community,
language differences, and lack of accessible support systems.
Ontario Advisory Council on Women's Issues, Brief to the Omario Govemmeru on Sole
Support Mothers (Toronto, 1987) at 16
Statistics Canada, Women in Canada: A Statistical Report, supra at 9, 121, 122, 131, 137, 138,
145, 146, 152, 160, 166

Marlee Kline, Complicating the Ideology of Motherhood: Child Welfare Law and First Nations
Women, 18 Queens Law Journal, 306--342, at 312, 324-326, 339
Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women, Sharing our F.Iperience (Ottawa, 1993),
at 19 - 29

IO

d.

CUSTODIAL MOTHERS AND ABUSE

17. Twenty-nine percent of women who have been married or in a common law relationship have

been physically or sexually assaulted by their partners on at least one occasion. One-fifth of women
reported that the violence continued after separation. For some women. the assaults began at the

20

time of separation, while for others, the violence escalated during separation.
Statistics Canada, Women in Canada: A Statistical Report, supra at 104, 105, 113.

18.

Legal processes are sometimes used by men as a means to harass women. One American

study estimates that at least one-half of contested child custody cases involve families with a history
of some form of family violence. Those men who cannot disconnect from the women they abuse,
use the legal system as a new arena of combat.

Final Report of the Canadian Panel on Violence Against Women, Changing the lmutscape:
Ending Violence - Achieving Equality (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1993) at 229-231

30

L. E. Walker and G. E. Edwall, ~Domestic Violence and Determination of Visitation in
Divorce~, chapter 8, in D. J. Sonkin (ed.), Domestic Violence on Trial: Psychological and
Legal Dimensions of Family Violence (New York: Springer Publishing Co, 1987) at 127-133
B.

THE INTERPRETATION OF SECTIONS 16 AND 17 OF THE DIVORCE ACT MUST
BE CONSISTENT WITH THE CHARTER'S GUARANTEES OF SEX EQUALITY

19. The Charter is the supreme law of Canada and, accordingly, statutes must be interpreted and
40

applied in a manner consistent with the fundamental values enshrined therein. Where a statute is
capable of more than one interpretation, the interpretation which most closely accords with Charter
values should be favoured.
Young v. Young, supra at 92, 107.
P. (D.) v. S. (C.), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 141 at 181.

Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] l S.C.R. 1038 at 1078.
Hills v. Canada (Attorney General), [1988] 1 S.C.R. 513 at 558.
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Canada (Attorney General) v. Mossop, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 544 at 581-582.

20. In accordance

with this Court's evolving jurisprudence,

while section 15 does not itself

guarantee social equality, equal law is seen as a means of attaining an equal society. Thus, the
purpose of section 15 is to ensure equality in the formulation and application of the law.

Andrews v. law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 at 171.
Willick v. Willick, supra at 705.
21. "An assessment of whether a particular interpretation of a statute is consistent with ... Charter
values necessitates a contextual approach which contemplates the social framework in which
the Act operates." "The social context of divorce is an evolving concept. So, too, are our
understandings of the economic consequences thereof."

Willick v. Willick, supra at 679, 699 and 706
Moge v. Moge, supra at 861-864.
22. It is submitted that the Divorce Ad provisions concerning custody, like those concerning
support, must be interpreted so as to promote the values of substantive, rather than formal equality.
20

Willick v. Willick, supra at 705- 706
Moge v. Moge, supra at 866-875
Andrews v. law Society of Upper Canada, supra at 174
23. This Court bas recognized that the legal treatment of women following separation has a
significant impact on the social and economic status of women and their children, and as such, their
substantive equality.

It is submitted that the section 15 guarantee of sex equality requires that

principles for determining the best interests of a child not impose a detrimental burden on women,

30

by virtue of women's primary responsibility for care of children before and after separation.
Restrictions on relocation perpetuate the relative disadvantage of women and their children.

Moge v. Moge, supra at 861
24. LEAF submits that with regard to issues of relocation. an interpretation of the custody
provisions of the Divorce Ad in a manner consistent with the Chaner's equality provisions,
recognizes;

40

a)

the relationship between the continuing gender-based division of labour before separation
and women's post-separation custodial responsibilities;

b)

the impact of their pre-separation role on women's ability to support themselves and their
children after separation; and

c)

the particular difficulties for single mothers in caring for themselves and their children
within a social context of a workworld that is largely unresponsive to their needs and
responsibilities.

- 7 -

C.

CUSTODY AND RELOCATION

a. EVOLUTION OF THE LAW
25. At common law and until the mid 19th century, fathers were entitled to sole custody of their
legitimate children as a matter of right, based on the view that fathers owned their wives and
children.

The exclusive right to custody included the right to determine where the child would live.

Fathers' absolute rights to custody were gradually eroded due in part to legislation, and in part to
the emergence of the equitable principle of the best interests of the child.

lo

Lapointe v. La.poinJe,supra at 7-8.
26. As Canadian custody jurisprudence developed, as set out in Lapointe v. La.poinie,the following
propositions evolved concerning a parent's wish to relocate with a child in his or her care:
a)

a custodial parent was free to change the place of residence of a child in his or her custody
without prior approval unless the power to make the decision to do so was restricted by
court order or agreement;

b)

on an application by an accessparent to forbid such a change, the onus was on the parent
to show that the change was motivated by an intention to defeat his or her access rights,
was unreasonable or was contrary to the best interests of the child;

c)

in deciding the best interests of a child, a judge would ordinarily defer to the decision of
the parent to whom the ultimate decision-making power with respect to that child bad been
entrusted, this, of course, assuming that the custodial parent's decision was bonafide and
reasonable;

d)

a custodial parent whose decision-making power with respect to residence was restricted
could nonetheless apply to a court for an order permitting a proposed move;

e)

on such an application, the custodial parent bad to show a sufficient change in
circumstances to justify the removal of the restriction and the bestowal of the decisionmaking power with respect to residence on him or her; and,
·

f)

where such a custodial parent discharged his or her burden, the other parent was in exactly
the same position as he or she would have been in on an application to forbid a change by
a custodial parent whose decision-making power was unrestricted.

20

30

Lapoinle v. La.poinJe,supra at 15, 16.
b.
40

CUSTODY AND RELOCATION UNDER THE DIVORCEACT

27. Today, questions of custody of and access to a child are determined based solely on the best
interests of the child.

Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, C.3. (2nd. Supp.), as amended, ss. 16(8) and 17(5).
Young v. Young, supra at 26, 117.
Lapointe v. Lapointe, supra at 17.
28. Section 16(7) of the DivorceAct contemplates that a custodial parent can relocate without court

approval.

- 8 -

Lapointe v. Lapointe, supra at 16.
29. Under s.16(10) of the Divorce Act, the principle that a child is to have as much contact with
each parent as is in the child's best interests, reflects that the focus is on the child's best interests,
rather than on maximizing contact per se as a legislative goal. The concept of maximum contact was
influenced by the principle of presumptive joint custody which has been firmly rejected throughout
Canada by federal and provincial legislatures.

The Divorce Act, s.16(10).
Lapointe v. Lapointe, supra at 17.

10

Federal/Provincial/Territorial

Family Law Committee, Custody and Access: Public

Discussion Paper, supra at 29- 31
D.

INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE "BF.ST INTERESTS OF THE
CHil..D" TEST

a.

GENERALLY

30. The best interests test requires a judge to decide what is in the best interests of a particular

20

child at the time the custody decision is made. While recognized factors are to be considered, the
weighing of each factor is left to the discretion of the judge, and there are no presumptions to aid
in this decision.

Young v. Young, supra at 117
E. Diane Pask and M. L. (Marnie) McCall "K.(M.M.) v. K. (U.) and the Primary Care Giver"
(1991), 33 R.F.L. (3d) 418 at 421.

b.
30

BEST INTERESTSAND RELOCATION

31. In interpreting
approaches

sections 16 and 17 of the Divorce Act, the courts have adopted various

to relocation cases.

In Caner v. Brooks, the Ontario Court of Appeal stated the

following considerations:

40

a)

the only principle that governs is the best interests of the child;

b)

the best interests test cannot be implemented by the devising of a code of substantive rules,
even if this could be done within the confines of a single case;

c)

the process should not begin with a general rule that one of the parties will be unsuccessful
unless he or she satisfies a specified burden of proof;

d)

at the end of the process, if it is not possible for the court to conclude on a result which
better accords with the best interests of the child, then the result must necessarily be in
accordance with the legal status quo on the issue to be decided;

e)

an important factor to take into account, in favour of the custodial parent, is that the
existing custody decision (by order or by agreement) shows that from a day-to-day point
of view, the best interests of the child lie with the child's being with the custodial parent;

- 9 -

f)

an incident of custody includes the determination by the custodial parent of where the
parent and the child shall live;

g)

if there is a new family unit as a result of a custodial parent having remarried, the wellbeing of that family unit bears on the best interests of the child;

h)

the nature of the relationship between the child and the access parent will always be of
importance;

i)

the reason for the move is important. If the move is necessary, this would count in favour
of the move;

j)

the distance of the move is of basic concern. The greater the distance, the more severe
the impact of the proposed move will be on the relationship with the access parent;

k)

the degree of severity of impact of the proposed move is also likely to be effected rather
directly by the financial resources of the access parent;

l)

the child's views

m)

the very general principle expressed ins. 16(10) of the Divorce Act {the maximum contact
provision) should be taken into account, whether or not it is expressed in statutory form.

lO

are relevant; and,

Caner v. Brooks {1991), 30 R.F.L. (3d) 53 (Ont.C.A.) at 61-65.

20

32. Carter v. Brooks effectively relied on only one of the considerations, that being, the test of
necessity {as set out in paragraph 31{i) above).

By placing the onus on the custodial mother to

justify that a move is necessary, and by reviewing the reasons for her decision to relocate, the court
eroded her ability to make decisions in the child's best interests.

33. More recently, an interpretation of sections 16 and 17 of the Divorce Act bas emerged which
reaffirms that custody is a package of responsibilities, including the responsibility to decide where

30

a child lives.

The most recent Court of Appeal cases reaffirm the pri.ociple in prior jurisprudence

of giving deference to the custodial parent's ability to determine and act in the child's best interests.

Levesque v. Lapointe (1993), 44 R.F.L. (3d) 316 (B.C.C.A.)
MacGyver v. Richards (1995), 11 R.F.L. (4th) 432 (Ont.C.A.)
Lapointe v. Lapointe, supra

c.

FACTORS RELEV A.i.'ITTO ISSUES OF RELOCATION

i.

40

THE CUSTODIAL PARENT IS IN THE BEST rosmoN
THE CHILD'S BEST INTERESTS

TO DETERMINE

34. The person in the best position to make decisions about the child's well-being is the custodial
parent.

As the person responsible for exercising judgment on a daily basis, who is most familiar

with the child's needs, and who will live with the reality of decisions, the custodial parent is better
situated than a judge to determine what is in the child's best interests, including residence.

Lapoime v. Lapoime, supra at 18.
Young v. Young, supra at 41 - 42.

.. 10 ..
MacGyver v. Richards, supra at 444 - 445.
In the marriage of I and I (1995), 19 Fam. L.R. 147 (Fam. Ct. of Australia) at 158.
James C. McLeod, annotation to Hines v. Hines (1992), 40 R.F.L. (3d) 274 (N.S.S.C. T.D.) at 277.
Karen M. Munro, "The Inapplicability of Rights Analysis in Post-Divorce Child Custody
Decision Making" (1992), 30 Alberta Law Review 852-899 at 893-899.

ii.

CUSTODY IS A SIGNIFICANTRESPONSIBILITY

35. Custody is an enormous undertaking for the custodial parent. The high level and constancy of

10

the responsibility

for custody is far greater than that of the parent who sees the child intermittently

and exercises access.

Young v. Young, supra at 51.
Thomson v. Thomson, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 551 at 589.
MacGyver v. Richards, supra at 445.
Lapointe v. Lapointe, supra at 22.

20

In the marriage of I and I, supra at 164.
iii.

THE BEST INTERESTSOF THE CHILD ARE LINKED TO THE WELLBEING OF THE CUSTODIALPARENT

36. The child's best interests are inextricably linked to the well-being of the custodial parent.

,Moge v. Moge, supra at 871
Young v. Young, supra at 70.
Levesque v. Lapointe, supra at 328.

30

MacGyver v. Richards, supra at 446.
Lapointe v. Lapoinre, supra at 19.
In the marriage of I and I, supra at 156.
Jr. and Andrew J. Cherlin, Divided Families: What Happens to Children
Mien Parents Part (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991) at 71-72.

Frank Furstenberg,

-W

Frank F. Furstenberg, S. Philip Morgan, and Paul D. Allison, "Paternal Participation and
Children's Well-Being After Marital Dissolution" (1987) 52 American Sociology Review 695701, at 697, 698.
Jeanne M. Tschann, Janet R. Johnston, Marsha Kline, and Judith S. Wallerstein, "Conflict,
Loss, Change and Parent-Child Relationships: Predicting Children's Adjustment During
Divorce" (1990) 13(4) Journal of Divorce 1-22, at 18-20.
Department

of Justice Canada, Response to 99 Steps, released 17 November 1995. at 8, 9.

3 7. The child's best interests are not only intimately intertwined with thewell-being of the custodial
parent, but with any new family unit. The custodial parent and the child are a new family unit on

- 11 -

separation.

The court must consider the effect on the mother, and thus on the family unit, of

restricting

where she can live. The goal of maintaining present access may be desirable, but not

at the cost of the well-being of the custodial mother and the child in her care.

Korpesho v. Korpesho (1982), 31 RF.I. (2d) 449 (Man. C.A.) at 451, 452.
Caner v. Brooks, supra at 63.
Macgyver v. Richards, supra at 446.
Lapointe v. Lapointe, supra at 22.
10

In the marriage of I and !, supra at 164.
James C. McLeod, annotation to Axam v. Seguin (1994), 5 R.F.L. (4th) 186 (Ont. Gen. Div.),
at 187.

Susan B. Boyd, "Is There An Ideology of Motherhood in (Post) Modem Child Custody?" paper
presented at the learned Societies Conference, Ottawa 1993, revised 1995, at 11-12

iv.

ACCF.SS-ASSUMPTIONS AND REALITIES

38. Access, including its nature and duration, is determined solely on the basis of the best interests

20

of the child rather than the needs and desires of the access parent. Custodial parents are expected
and obliged to make decisions and to conduct their lives consistent with the child's best interests,
not with the needs and desires of the access parent.

Thomson v. Thomson,supra at 589.
M. (B.P.) V.M. (B.L.D.E.) (1992), 42 R.F.L. (3d) 349 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C.
refused (1993), 48 R.F.L. (3d) 232, at 360.

Macgyver v. Richards, supra at 446, 448.
30

Lapointe v. Lapointe, supra at 17.
39. Principles of interpretation that restrict the relocation of custodial parents have been based on
certain
accurate.
a)

40

assumptions and myths regarding access.

These assumptions regarding access are not

or are usually unexamined in relation to the facts of a particular case:
the assumption that maximum contact with both parents is beneficial for all children. The
reality is that maximum contact with t,oth parents is not necessarily beneficial for all
children, and therefore, ordering or agreeing to it is not necessarily in the best interests
of all children. The majority of studies based on large national surveys in the United
States, found little association between father visitation and children's well being;

MacGyver v. Richards, supra at 446.
Lapointe v. Lapointe, supra at 17.
Valerie King, "Variation in the Consequences of Non-Resident Father Involvement
for Child's Well-being" (1994), 56 Journal of Marriageand the Family 963-972, at
963.

- 12 Denise Donnelly and David Finkelhor, "Does Equality in Custody Arrangement
Improve the Parent-Child Relationship?" (1992), 54 Journal of Marriage and the
Family, at 837, 842-844.
C. James Richardson,

Divorce and Family Mediation Research Study in Three

Canadian Cities, supra at 31 - 32.
Federal/Provincial/Territorial

Family Law Committee, Custody and Access: Public

Discussion Paper, supra at 29-31.
b)
IO

the assumption that where access has diminished, the problem is with the custodial parent
interfering with access. The reality is that access parents do not necessarily exercise their
access. In women's experience, the major problem with access is that men do not always
exercise their access rights or that they do so erratically or unpredictably;
C. James Richardson, Coun-based Divorce Mediation in Four Canadian Cities: An
Overview of Research Results, A Report Prepared for the Department of Justice
Canada, February 1988 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1988) at
36, 38-39.
C. James Richardson, Divorce and Family Mediation Research Studies in Three
Canadian Cities, supra at 287 -8.

20

Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr., Christine Winquist Nord, James L. Peterson, and Nicholas
Zill, "The Life Course of Children of Divorce: Marital Disruption and Parental
Contact" (1983) 48 American Sociological Review, 656-668, Table 6 at 663.
Federal/Provincial/Territorial
Family Law Committee, Custody and Access: Public
Discussion Paper, supra at 17.
c)

30

the assumption that frequent access is more beneficial. The reality is that frequent access
as opposed to amount of time spent, is not necessarily more beneficial for a child (that is,
that one day per week for 7 weeks is not necessarily better than 1 full week). What
counts is not the quantity of time, but the extent to which the access parent and child have
a relationship in which the child feels valued. The regularity and predictability of visits
is more important than frequency of visits;
M.B. Isaacs, B. Montalvo, and D. Abelsohn, The Difficult Divorce: Therapy for
Children and Families (New York: Basic Books, 1986) at 273.
Judith S. Wallerstein and Sandra Blakeslee, Second Chances: Men, Women and
Children A Decade after Divorce (N. Y.: Ticknor & Fields, 1989) at 238. '

d)

40

the assumption that proximity is a predictor of regular contact. The reality is that
proximity is not always a predictor of regular contact. More significant is the commitment
of the access parent to exercising access, and the relationship between the access parent
and the child;
Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr., Christine Winquist Nord, James L. Peterson, and Nicholas
Zill, "The Life Course of Children of Divorce: Marital Disruption and Parental
Contact", supra Table 7 at 665,666.

e)

the assumption that the standard access arrangement is the most beneficial. The reality
is that the overwhelming number of boiler-plate access arrangements in orders and
agreements indicates a bias towards a standard structure. Underlying that bias is an

- 13 assumption that this arrangement is in the best interests of the child. The standard access
structure (every other weekend, plus one week night) is not necessarily the best
arrangement simply because it is typical;

0

the assumption that the original access arrangement is the appropriate access arrangement
for all time. The reality is that the access arrangement agreed to (or court ordered) at one
time is not always the most suitable arrangement for all time. Access appropriate for a
2-year old child may not be appropriate for a 7-year old or a 13-year old. In reality,
access is restrucrured on an on-going basis by parents, to take into account the ages and
stages of the child.

MacGyver v. Richards, supra at 443.

10

LApointe v. lApointe, supra at 22.
Courtney v. Courtney (1992), 42 R.F.L. (3d) 450 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at 451-453.
Eleanor E. Maccoby and Robert H. Mnookin, Dividing the Child: Social and Legal
Dilemmas of Custody, supra at 198-202.
g)

20

the assumption that the post-separation arrangement should follow the pre-separation
arrangement as closely as possible. The reality is that post-separation arrangements cannot
and should not attempt to look like the pre-separation arrangements. It is an impossible
ideal, unrealistic, ignores any conflicts that exists between the parents, and assumes such

an arrangement could work;

Martha A. Fineman, "DominanJ Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal
Changes in Child Custody Decision-Making" (1988), 101 Harv. L. Rev. 727-744, at
769.
h)

the assumption that change is bad for children. The reality is that change by definition,
is not necessarily bad for children. If a child has stability of care, the child can deal with
and accept change.
David Gately and Andrew I. Schwebel, "Favourable Outcomes in Children After
Parental Divorce" in Craig A. Everett, ed., Divorce and the Next Generation (New
York: The Haworth Press, 1992) at 57, 61.

30

d.

PRINCIPLES FOR DETERMINING W1IAT IS IN THE CHILD'S
INTERESTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH CHARTERVALUES

BEST

40. While the best interests of the child must be a child-centred test, it is submitted that the
inextricable link between the well-being of the child and the custodial mother, requires a recognition
of the realities and interests of the custodial mother.

Promoting women's substantive equality is

fundamental to the well-being of women and the children in their care. Accordingly, it is submitted
that the concept of the best interests of the child should be interpreted in a manner consistent with
the constitutional goal of promoting women's substantive equality.
41. It is submitted that an interpretative approach to the best interests of the child which reaffirms
the decision to relocate as an incident of custodial responsibility, and which defers to the decisionmaking of the custodial parent, as set out in the most recent Court of Appeal decisions (Levesque
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v. Lapointe, MacGyver v. Richards, and Lapoime v. l.Apoinle), more closely accords with the values
enshrined

in section 15 of the Charter.

42. As a result of the social and economic disadvantage experienced by custodial mothers and their
children,

they will need to move in order to:

a)

obtain employment or better employment to become as self-supporting as possible.
Improved employment includes employment with sufficient flexibility to enable custodial
mothers to meet their children's needs;

b)

obtain adequate and affordable child care so as to allow women to work and accommodate
their child rearing responsibilities;

c)

obtain support or create distance if the post-separation relatiomhip is abusive;

d)

seek or maintain support from family, friends or new family units so as to best meet their

tO

children's needs;

20

e)

obtain adequate and affordable housing; and,

f)

attend school or retraining, to improve their chances of finding a job.

These needs occur within a social context of a highly mobile society, especially in relation to work.
Bali Ram, Y. Edwards Shin, Michel Pouliot, Canadians on the Move (Statistics Canada and
Prentice Hall Canada Inc., 1994), Cat. No. 96-309E, at 1, 3, 7, 16.

Korpesho v. Korpesho, supra at 451
43. It is submitted that deference to the relocation decisions of custodial parents is consistent with
the modem philosophy of family breakdown, which aims at encouraging and facilitating the ability

of former spouses to get on with their lives.
30

Korpesho v. Korpesho, supra at 451, 452.
44. It is submitted that in considering the best interests of the child with respect to issues of
relocation,

a large measure of deference should be accorded to the custodial mother's judgment.

This deference is based upon, and should be exercised to include recognition:

..io

a)

that the custodial mother is in a better position to judge the child's best interests, relative
to the court or the access parent;

b)

of the significant responsibilities involved in caring for a child as a custodial mother;

c)

of the social and economic disadvantage experienced by custodial mothers which limit their
ability to meet their child care responsibilities and make it necessary for them to move;

d)

of the importance to the child of supporting
responsibilities; and,

e)

that caution should be exercised in second-guessing the custodial mother's judgment that
a move is in the child's best interests.

the custodial mother in meeting her

45. It is submitted that, in interpreting sections 16 and 17 of the Divorce Act, a failure to recognize
the substantive differences between custody and access in terms of the significance to the child's

- 15 well-being and in tenns of the nature and extent of parental responsibilities, is inconsistent with the
Chaner guarantee of substantive equality for women and reflects a formal equality approach, which

was rejected by this Court in Andrews.
Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, supra at 174.

46. When a court considers whether a relocation by a custodial mother is "necessary" (as in Carter
v. Brooks),

it exercises judgment and applies a standard to the custodial mother that it does not

apply to an access parent making a similar decision. No court orders are made forcing access
1o

parents to move, co stay, or to exercise their access. Courts do not restrict the relocation of an
access parent for the sake of the child's best interests, whether the motivation to relocate was

benign, or whether the change in access was harmful to the child.
MacGyver

v. Richards, supra at 447

4 7. A request to relocate ought not to be determined on the grounds of whether an access parent

is exercising access, or bas fulfilled his legal or moral obligations. By exercising access and paying
20

support the access parent is doing what he is required to do. Courts should be wary of introducing

an analysis that rewards access parents for visiting their children and paying support, to the
detriment of the custodial parent.
James G. McLeod, annotation to Wainio v. Gilmour (1994), 2 R.F.L. (4th) 116, (Ont. C.A.)
at 117-118.
48. The fact that a child will be affected by a relocation decision, like many other decisions of a

custodial parent, does not mean that a court should interfere with or change that decision. On
JO

relocation,

access can be restructured in accordance with the child's overall interests.

An

assumption that it cannot be restructured in this way, places too much significance on the status quo

as to access. as;

40

a)

there are situations where the distances involved and the economic circumstaoces of the
parents require radical restructuring, and even limiting access. However. access is not
restricted to in-person contact.
Technology offers parents and children various
opportunities for contact; and,

b)

access options and arrangements that are in the child's best interests will continue to
evolve as the circumstances of the child and the parents change.
MacGyver v. Richards, supra, at 445.
Lapointe v. Lapoinle, supra at 18, 19.

In the marriage of I and I, supra at 164
Eleanor E. Maccoby and Robert H. Mnookin,Dividing the Child: Social and Legal
Dilemmas of Custody, supra at 295.
James C. McLeod, annotation to Axam v. Seguin, supra at 187

49. It is submitted that to interpret sections 16 and 17 of the Divorce Act in a manner consistent
with section 15 of the Charter, the court should apply the following test: where a parent with sole
custody seeks to relocate, the move, in and of itself, is a material change in circumstances with
respect to access only, but not with respect to custody.

Accordingly, a sole custodial parent's

decision to relocate is not subject to the court's review, as the relocation decision is an incident of
custody.

E.

However, access may be restructured by the court.

JOINT CUSTODY

a.

EVOLUTION OF THE LAW

50. Joint custody is a relatively new legal concept in Canada.
Balcer v. Baker (1979), 8 R.F.L. (2d) 236 at 244.

Kruger v. Kruger (1979) 11. R.F.L. (2d) 52 at 78.
Julian Payne and Brenda Edwards "Co-operative Parenting after Divorce: A Canadian
Perspective" ( 1989), 11 Advocates' Quarterly 1-30 at 1.

51. Section 16(4) of the Divorce Act allows the court to make an order granting custody or access
"to any one or more persons" . Although it does not use the words joint custody, this is referred
to as the joint custody provision of the Divorce Act. Neither this section, the remainder of the

Divorce Act, nor any other legislative provision contains a definition of joint custody.

52. Initially, joint custody was only ordered in the rare circumstance where both parties agreed.
Courts are no longer as reluctant to impose joint custody on parents as they once were, and indeed,
joint custody orders take many forms. The meaning of the phrase joint custody is indeterminate.
At one end of the continuum is joint legal custody, with sole caregiving provided by one parent and
minimal contact by the other parent. In the middle is joint legal custody, with primary caregiving

provided by one parent and contact by the other parent that looks like "liberal access" described in
sole custody and access circumstances.

At the extreme other end of the continuum is joint legal

custody, which also includes joint physical custody, where both parents provide equal caregiving
of the child and make decisions about the child on a consensus basis. All of these arrangements are
called "joint custody".

As a result, it is impossible to determine the factual reality of a legal joint

custody order without reference to the practical circumstances of the care for the child. Most joint
custody orders include an award of "primary residence" or "primary care and control" to one
parent, and fixed specified time for the other parent to see the child. Only occasionally do joint
custody orders set out areas of joint decision-making. Orders for joint legal custody combined with
joint physical custody are the exception.

Baker v. Baker, supra at 246.
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Kruger v. Kruger, supra at 79, 80.
Hines v. Hines (1992), 40 R.F.L. (3d) 274 (N.S.S.C. - T.D.) at 289-290
Kaemmle v. Jewson (1993), 50 R.F.L. (3d) 70 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at 74-75.
Hussein v. Hussein (1994), 3 R.F.L. (4th) 375 (N.B.Q.D.) at 384-385.
Tweel v. Tweel (1994), 7 R.F.L. (4th) 204 (P.E.I.T.D.) at 216
Keown v. Keown, [1995] B.C.J. No. 26 (B.C.S.C., Master, 4 January 1995)
Radford v. Cassiano, [1995] O.J. No. 105 (Ont. Prov. Crt., 18 January, 1995)
10

Woodland v. Ceeco, [1995] B.C.J. No. 226 (B.C.S.C., 8 February 1995)
Julian Payne & Brenda Edwards, "Co-operative Parenting After Divorce", supra, at 5-7.
Frank Furstenberg, Jr. and Andrew J. Cherlin, Divided Families: What Happens to Children
When Parents Pan, supra at 74, 76.

Denise Donnelly and David Finkelhor, "Does Equality in Custody Arrangement Improve the
Parent-Child Relationship?", supra at 837

Eleanor E. Maccoby and Robert H. Mnookin, Dividing the Child: Social and Legal Dilemmas
20

of Custody, supra at 269.

b.

JOINT CUSTODY AND RELOCATION

53. Most joint custody arrangements, whether by order or agreement, are in fact more akin to the
traditional

sole custody and access arrangements,

responsibilities.

regardless of legal attribution of rights and

Further, women in joint custody arrangements usually have, in fact, the primary

custodial responsibility.

Even with joint physical custody, women still find themselves making most

of the day-to-day decisions about the child, and assuming responsibility for most daily child related

30

tasks.

Accordingly,

it is necessaryto distinguish between the legal description of the arrangement

and the factual reality of the arrangement.

Young v. Young, supra at 49-50.
Levesque v. Lapointe, supra at at 325.
Lapointe v. Lapointe, supra at 20.
In the marriage of I and I, supra at 161.
40

Statistics Canada, Women in Canada: A Statistical Repon, supra at 18, 69, 70.

C. James Richardson, Coun-based Divorce Mediation in Four Canadian Cities: An Overview
of Research Results, supra at 35.
C. James Richardson, Divorce and Family Mediation Research Study in Three Canadian Cities,
supra at 320.

Eleanor E. Maccoby and Robert H. Mnook.in, Dividing the Child: Social and Legal Dilemmas
of Custody, supra at 268, 269, 279.
E. Diane Pask and M. L. McCall (Marnie) McCall "K. (M.M.) v. K. (U.) and the
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Primary Care Giver", supra at 427-428.
54. It is submitted that courts must analyze each situation to determine whether a joint custody
arrangement,

in law, is in fact true equal parenting, in roles and responsibilities, or one more akin

to sole custody. In contrast to the situation where each parent bas sole responsibility for the day-today management of the child's life while the child is living with that parent, for equal periods of
time, the primary custodial parent is the person who bas primary day-to-day experienceof and
contact with the child, and who bas the most information available to determine issues regarding the
10

child's well-being. The following are factors to determine who is a primary custodial parent:
a)

custodial responsibility involves not only arranging the child's life, but arranging one's life
around the child;

b)

custodial responsibility is not necessarily a question of quantum of time spent with the
child. Although quantum of time spent may be an indicator, it is an over simplification to
look only at time spent;

c)

custodial responsibility is to be examined over the entire life of the child, not simply the
period post-separation;

d)

custodial responsibility is about taking responsibility for ensuring the child's daily needs
are met, not solely doing various tasks related to the child;

e)

custodial responsibility is about determining which parent tracks the child's movement
during the day, and whom the child keeps informed of her whereabouts; and,

t)

custodial responsibility is about which parent bas primary management of the child's daily
life, and of the organization of the child's daily life.

20

Levesque v. LapoinJe, supra at 328.
Lapointe v. Lapointe. supra at 20-21.

30

55. The primary custodial parent perfonns her child care responsibilities in the same social context
and generally

in the same manner as sole custodial parents, and the same principles regarding

relocation should accordingly apply.
assumes

the responsibilities of a sole custodial parent, a relocation is a material change in

circumstances
40

It is submitted that where a joint custodial parent in fact,

49 applies.

with regard to access only, but not with regard to custody and the test in paragraph
It is submitted that a failure to interpret the best interests concept in this way is to put

form over substance in a manner inconsistent with the equality values enshrined in the Chane,.

56. If all the indicia of true equal parenting are met, a decision to relocate is a material change in
circumstances with respect to custody, and the court must re-examine the custody arrangement itself,
not whether one parent can move.

Levesque v. Lapointe. supra at 325.
Lapointe v. LapoinJe,supra at 20-21.

- 19 -

F.

SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND COURT ORDERS WITH RELOCATION
RESTRICTIONS

57. Where a separation agreement or court order contains a relocation restriction, it is submitted
that the relocation of a parent with sole or primary custodial responsibility amounts to a material
change in circumstances with regard to residence and access, but not with respect to custody. The
relocation restriction, by virtue of the court order or agreement, is subject to the court's review.
It is submitted in determining the best interests of the child, the onus should be on the access parent
to establish that the move is contrary to the child's best interests, and the principles enunciated in
10

paragraphs 34-39 should be applied on the review.
58. A relocation restriction in a separation agreement is not determinative of the child's best
interests, and should be given little weight in that:
a)

a court is obliged to consider only the best interests of the child as it exists at the time of
the application, both at first instance and on variation;

b)

while a relocation restriction may have been appropriate at the time the agreement was
entered into, it may be inappropriate at a later date, on an analysis of the child's best
interests;

c)

any analysis of the significance or validity of relocation restrictions in agreements must
include an analysis of women's unequal bargaining power in post-separation negotiations,
and why such a clause was entered into. The choices that women make post-separation are
tied to the social context and the circumstances in which they find themselves before and
after separation. A relocation restriction may not reflect any real consensus that a
relocation would not be in the best interests of a child.

20

Divorce Act, ss. 16(8) and 17(5)

30

Richardson v. Richardson, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 857 at 869 - 870.
Willick v. Willick, supra at 686, 727 - 29
Levesque v. Lapoinre, supra at 323.

Marcia Neave, Resolving the Dilemma of Difference: A Critique of "The Role of
Private Ordering in Family Law" (1994), 44 University of Toronto Law Journal 90131, at 110-131.
Donald Poirier and Michelle Boudreau, "Fonnal Versus Real Equality in Separation
Agreements in New Brunswick" (1992), 10 Canadian Journal of Family Law 239-256,
at 251-256.

40
G.

CONCLUSION

59. It is submitted that the test to be applied in determining relocation applications is as follows:

a)

Sole Custody:
Where a parent with sole custody seeks to relocate, the move, in and of itself, is a
material change in circumstances with respect to access only, but not with respect to
custody. Accordingly, a sole custodial parent's decision to relocate is not subject to the
court's review, as the relocation decision is an iocident of custody. However, access may

- 20 be restructured

b)

by the court.

Legal Joint Custody with a Primary Custodial Parent:
Where a parent with primary custodial responsibility, in a legal joint custody arrangement,
seeks to relocate, the test for a parent with sole custody should be applied.

c)

Legal Joint Custody: True Equal Parenting:
Where a parent with legal joint custody, in a true equal parenting situation, seeks to
relocate, the move is a material change in circumstances with respect to custody, and the
court must re-examine the custody arrangement itself, and not the decision to relocate.

IO

d)

Relocation Restrictions in Orders or Agreements:
Where an order or agreement contains a relocation restriction, the decision of a parent
with sole or primary custodial responsibility to relocate, is a material change in
circumstances with respect to residence and access, but not with respect to custody. The
relocation restriction, by virtue of the order or agreement, is subject to the court's review.
In determining the best interests of the child, the onus is on the access parent to establish
that the move is contrary to the child's best interests, and the principles set out in
paragraphs 34-39 must be applied.

20
PART IV:

ORDER SOUGHT

60. Based on the principles of interpretation outlined above, LEAF submits that this appeal should
be dismissed.

ALL OF WIIlCH IS RESPECTFULLY

SUBMITTED.

30

,~,,
ONNAWILSON
40

Solicitors for the Intervenor
The Women's Legal Education and Action Fund.
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